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SINCE ITS inception in 1950, Formula 1 has been described as the premier 
world motor-sport series; and it is now probably the most popular annual sporting 
event in the world. It is currendy broadcast in more than 130 countries, with an 
audience of about five billion viewers during the 1999 season. Formula 1 is also 
the most sophisticated motor-racing event in the world. It is highly competitive at 
many levels: among the drivers, the teams, the constructors and even the 
advertisers sponsoring the teams. Technologically, Formula 1 is at the leading edge 
of motor-racing, with constructors and teams investing significant resources in 
research and development, all of which must be carried out within the strict 
parameters set by the governing body, the Federation Internationale de 
l'Automobile (hereinafter the 'FIA'). 
At track level, the teams and the drivers nevertheless continue to be the main 
players. Although it is difficult to tell whether the team or the driver has a greater 
impact on die final race results, success ultimately depends upon building a 
winning combination of team and driver. It is therefore essential for a team to 
secure the services of one of the best drivers and for a driver to find a 'seat' with 
one of the few top teams. This may lead a driver to change teams between racing 
seasons and occasionally even to sign a contract with another team for the same 
racing season. In such a highly competitive environment, the importance of each 
contract between a team and its driver is obvious. All interested parties must be 
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able to establish immediately and witfi certainty whether such a contract is valid 
and in force; and in cases of several conflicting contracts, which one should prevail. 
Until the end of the 1990s, these types of contractual disputes were submitted to 
ordinary State courts. This proved to be highly unsatisfactory, as was demonstrated 
by the confusion ensuing from a multiparty drama in 1989 involving one driver 
who signed contracts with three different teams for the same racing season. 
As a result of such cases, the FIA and all the teams agreed to establish a dispute 
resolution system under the name 'Contract Recognition Board' (hereinafter the 
'CRB'). The purpose of the CRB system is to provide for the speedy and final 
resolution of disputes regarding the team for which a particular driver will render 
his racing services in any given Formula 1 Championship. The CRB system is 
based upon two fundamental requirements: (1) all driver contracts must be made 
in writing and registered with the CRB; and (2) all disputes over conflicting driver 
contracts must be submitted to ad hoc arbitration before the CRB. The CRB 
system first came into operation for the 1992 season, and it has since functioned to 
the satisfaction of all parties. The CRB does not publish its awards, and its 
proceedings are boui private and stricdy confidential. Many disputes are settled 
before reaching the stage of any award. It is believed that only about five cases have 
been the subject of final awards on the merits. This is likely due to the structure of 
the CRB system which gready facilitates the resolution of many contentious cases 
at a preliminary phase. The CRB has also had an important 'preventative effect', as 
intended by its founders, which has further reduced the total number of disputes. 
Despite its successful track record of dispute resolution, a Formula 1 racing 
team has recendy challenged the scope of the CRB's jurisdiction in proceedings 
before die English High Court. In its judgment in Walkinshaw& Ors v. Diniz,1 the 
High Court considered not only die scope of disputes submitted to the CRB but 
also the very nature of the CRB: do proceedings before die CRB constitute true 
arbitration? Or are they merely an internal process for deciding the 'rules of the 
game'? In this article, we will first provide an overview of the CRB system and then 
offer our comments on the decision rendered by the English High Court in 
Walkinshaw & Ors v. Diniz, a decision that we believe is important not only for 
the future of the CRB but also more generally for defining the legal requirements 
for sports and other accelerated dispute resolution systems. 
I. C R B O V E R V I E W 2 
The CRB system is based upon a framework agreement between the FIA and all 
teams taking part in the Formula 1 Championship. This framework agreement has 
Thomas J, Commercial Court, 19 May 1999 (unreported), 1999 Folio No. 522. See transcribed judgment, 
Appendix, infra p. 193. 
For a general description of the CRB system see: H. Peter, 'Conflicting Contracts in Sport; Resolution 
through Central Filing and Ad Hoc Arbitration', in Arbitration of Sport Related Disputes (Swiss Arbitration 
Association, Special Series No. 1, November 1998), p. 63 et seq. 
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established two basic procedures for regulating driver contracts. First, every 
contract for the services of a Formula 1 driver must be duly registered with the 
CRB in accordance with certain detailed provisions reviewed below. Secondly, 
every such contract must contain a standard arbitration clause pursuant to which all 
conflicts between contracts involving the same driver and die same racing season 
must be submitted to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal sitting in Geneva, Switzerland, 
namely the CRB, comprising three permanent members drawn from a panel of six 
members. The FIA ensures that all parties comply with these requirements, and 
implement any resulting decision of the CRB, through its procedures for licensing 
drivers to participate in the Formula 1 Championship. 
(a) The Arbitration Clause 
Under the CRB system, every contract for the services of a Formula 1 driver must 
contain an arbitration clause pursuant to which the parties agree: 
(1) to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CRB in order to determine 
which team, as a matter of priority, is entitled to the services of the driver; 
and 
(2) that in respect of said issues, the jurisdiction of any competent judicial or 
other authority as regards interim or conservatory measures is expressly 
excluded. 
The parties' written agreement to such provision is also confirmed in the written 
and signed application for registration with the CRB Secretariat. 
(b) The Arbitral Tribunal 
The CRB is composed of three arbitrators or 'board members', each having a 
different nationality, wim three alternate members. All the board members are 
qualified lawyers of international standing and experience, having no ties whatsoever 
to any of die parties and no involvement of any kind in Formula 1 motor-racing. 
They are appointed by the President of the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce. The CRB meets as often as deemed 
necessary in Geneva, Switzerland. The CRB has the power to establish its own rules 
of procedure. To date, die CRB has issued rules addressing numerous procedural 
matters such as notices, submissions, the taking of evidence and die conduct of 
hearings (which may be held by telephone or odier electronic means). 
(c) The CRB Secretariat 
The CRB is assisted by a Secretary who by definition is a public notary based in 
Geneva, assisted by a permanent staff member. Every contract for die services of a 
Formula 1 driver must be registered with die Secretary. The Secretary provides 
permanent, professional and specialized services in a neutral and accessible location. 
Moreover, die Secretary ensures diat no third party obtains access to the highly 
confidential terms of die various contracts between the Formula 1 teams and drivers. 
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(d) Registration 
The CRB system is built upon the requirement to register every agreement that 
constitutes the contractual basis for a driver to take part in the Formula 1 
Championship or for a team to secure a driver's services (including by way of 
option) for the Formula 1 Championship. 
The parties are required to register any such agreement, or any modification 
thereof, immediately following its execution. At the same time, the parties must 
also complete and execute a form summarizing certain of the main elements of the 
agreement: the identity of the parties, the name of the team for which the driver 
shall race, the duration of the agreement (with options to extend), and the fact that 
the agreement contains the CRB standard arbitration clause (hereinafter the 
'Form'). One of the parties must then deliver a sealed envelope to the Secretary of 
the CRB. This sealed envelope must contain two further sealed envelopes, one 
marked 'Contract' containing a copy of all contractual documents (in which any 
amounts are blanked out) and another marked 'Form' containing a duly executed 
original of the Form. Immediately upon receipt, the Secretary is required to open 
the envelope marked 'Form' and enter the information contained therein, as well 
as the exact date and time of receipt of the Form, into the official contract 
register. The Secretary is not, however, permitted to open the envelope marked 
'Contract'. The Secretary then acknowledges receipt of the envelopes to the 
parties. 
By maintaining an official contract register setting out the information contained 
in the Forms, the Secretary is able to monitor the possibility of any conflicting 
contracts. Whenever it appears mat a contract has been concluded for the same 
driver and the same Formula 1 Championship (s) as a previously registered 
contract, the Secretary is required to notify all relevant parties. Unless resolved 
within a short time, the question of the priority between two such apparently 
conflicting contracts is then referred to the CRB. 
(e) Meeting of the CRB 
Unless one of the parties chooses to waive its contractual rights or all parties agree 
with the CRB to extend the time-limit, the CRB is required to convene a meeting 
within three working days after the Secretary first becomes aware of the existence 
of apparently conflicting contracts. At this meeting, all interested parties have the 
right to be heard and make submissions in accordance with the directions of the 
CRB. It is usually a tripartite hearing with the driver, the 'old' team and the 'new' 
team. The CRB has the power to require the presence of any witness and the filing 
of any evidence it may deem necessary in order to discharge its duties. The CRB is 
also entitled to draw whatever conclusions it may deem appropriate from any 
failure to comply with its directions regarding witnesses and evidence. 
(f) Decision of the CRB 
Within three days after the meeting with the parties, the CRB must issue a written 
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decision stating which contract is the prevailing contract. This contract is deemed 
to take precedence over any other contract in respect of the same period or any 
overlapping period. 
In making this decision, the CRB is required to follow a two-step analysis of the 
conflicting contracts. The CRB must first determine whether, under the applicable 
laws, one or more of the contracts is null and void or has been validly terminated 
or has expired. The CRB also has the power to decide whether any of the 
contracts has been terminated subject to some form of a payment provided in the 
contract.3 If the CRB concludes that one of die contracts has been terminated, it 
will declare that die other contract is the only one in existence and that it shall 
therefore 'prevail'. If the CRB determines that there is more than one valid 
contract and that these are indeed conflicting, it must find that the first contract 
registered with the Secretary of the CRB is the prevailing contract, regardless of the 
signature dates appearing on the contracts and any provision of law. The CRB's 
exclusive reliance on the date and time of registration with the Secretary renders 
the risk that some parties may back-date contracts largely irrelevant. 
The CRB must set out the reasons for its decision. The CRB may only address 
those matters that are strictly necessary in order to establish which one of the 
conflicting contracts shall prevail. The CRB is not authorized to deal with any 
other issue (except costs) in its decision. The decision of the CRB is final and 
conclusive. Immediately upon issue by the CRB, the decision is notified to the 
parties, the Secretary of the CRB and the FIA. It is not published by the CRB, 
although the CRB is authorized to setde the terms of a press release. 
(g) Time of the Essence 
One of the primary objectives of the CRB system is to provide a final and binding 
decision on conflicting contracts within the shortest possible time. Consequendy, 
in addition to die very short time limits for convening a meeting and issuing a 
decision, the rules further provide that the Secretary and the CRB shall take 
whatever steps may be necessary to enable the CRB to render its decision as soon 
as practically possible. The first CRB decision was rendered within four working 
days of the parties' dispute; and subsequent cases have generally been decided 
within a very short time-period. This procedure is not easy for the parties' legal 
advisers; but the scope of the parties' dispute is limited before the CRB: it is a 
contract recognition board and not a contract disputes board. 
(h) Delivery of Licence 
Once the CRB has rendered a decision on conflicting driver contracts, the FIA will 
only deliver a licence authorizing the driver to participate in the Formula 1 
Championship for the team that succeeded in die arbitration proceedings before 
In the case, for instance, of so-called exit or buy-out clauses. 
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the CRB. In addition to providing for the resolution of disputes through such 
arbitration proceedings, the FIA and die teams taking part in the Formula 1 
Championship have established a procedure to ensure ongoing compliance with 
the CRB system. Within two days after expiry of the time-limit for filing entries in 
the Formula 1 Championship, the FIA must submit to the Secretary of the CRB a 
list of the teams applying for entry in the Championship, together with the names 
of their appointed drivers. The Secretary must, within two days thereafter, deliver 
to the FIA a confirmation that the teams have in fact secured the services of their 
appointed drivers under duly registered contracts. In the absence of such con-
firmation, the FIA will not provide a licence to the driver and consequently, the 
driver will not be entitled to take part in the Formula 1 Championship. 
As a result of the CRB system, each team and driver must meet three basic 
conditions in order to participate in the Formula 1 Championship: 
(1) the driver and the team must be parties to a contract which is registered 
with the Secretary of the CRB; 
(2) this contract must contain the standard arbitration clause of the CRB; and 
(3) this contract must not conflict with any other pre-registered and valid 
contract with another team for the services of the same driver. 
II. T H E CASE OF WALKINSHAWv. DINIZ 
In 1997, Pedro Diniz, a Formula 1 driver (hereinafter the 'Driver') entered into a 
contract with the Formula 1 team Arrows (hereinafter 'Team 1') for the 1998 and 
1999 Formula 1 Championships. Under the terms of this contract, Team 1 agreed 
to supply a competitive car that would meet certain guaranteed minimum 
performance targets. The parties agreed that the Driver would be entitled to 
terminate the contract unilaterally in the event that these guaranteed minimum 
performance targets were not met at the end of the 1998 Formula 1 
Championship. The parties also agreed that the Driver would be entitled to 
terminate the contract in any event, provided that he made a substantial 
termination payment to Team 1 under an exit clause. The contract between the 
Driver and Team 1 was registered with the Secretary of the CRB; and as also 
expressly confirmed by the parties, it contained the CRB standard arbitration 
clause. However, the contract also provided that, subject to this arbitration clause, 
'This agreement shall be governed by English law and shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of England'. 
At the end of the 1998 Formula 1 Championship, the Driver notified Team 1 
that it had not complied with its contractual obligation regarding the guaranteed 
minimum performance targets and that, accordingly, he was exercising his right to 
terminate the contract with immediate effect. Team 1 disputed that the Driver was 
entitled to terminate for breach of the performance guarantee. However, Team 1 
appeared to accept the termination on the basis that the Driver was liable to make 
the termination payment required under the exit clause. At about the same time, the 
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Driver entered into anouier contract widi Sauber, another Formula 1 team 
(hereinafter 'Team 2') for the 1999 Formula 1 Championship. This contract was 
delivered to the Secretary of the CRB, who immediately notified the Driver and 
Team 1 and Team 2 that an apparendy conflicting contract (that between the Driver 
and Team 1) had already been registered for the 1999 Formula 1 Championship. 
(a) Proceedings before the CRB 
Team 1 then refused to confirm that its contract with the Driver had been 
terminated; and accordingly the CRB convened a meeting in Geneva of all three 
interested parties. After reviewing the facts and hearing the parties, the CRB 
determined that the contract between the Driver and Team 1 had been terminated 
and therefore the only existing contract was that between die Driver and Team 2. 
As a result, die CRB found that mis second contract was the prevailing contract; 
and it directed the Secretary of the CRB to amend the official contract register 
accordingly. 
In his submissions, the Driver requested the CRB to make a further finding on 
die grounds for termination of his contract with Team 1: was he entitled to 
terminate this contract for breach of the performance guarantee or was he required 
to make the rather onerous termination payment to Team 1 ? Due to die fact that 
the 1999 Formula 1 Championship was about to begin, the CRB's decision on the 
conflicting contracts was particularly urgent. Accordingly, the CRB provided for a 
further meeting with additional submissions to deal with the cause and 
consequences of the contract termination, including (in particular) its disputed 
jurisdiction to resolve these issues. 
For this second meeting, die Driver submitted that die grounds for termination of 
the contract fell squarely widiin die jurisdiction of the CRB. The Driver relied on the 
wording of the CRB rules and die requirement that the CRB resolve any controversy 
in a speedy and final manner. Team 1 took the position that die CRB had no 
jurisdiction to address this question because it was not necessary to do so in order to 
determine whedier or not die contract had been terminated. Team 1 emphasized 
mat both parties now agreed mat die contract was terminated - die only point on 
which they differed was whether die Driver was liable for the termination payment 
Based upon the choice of forum clause set out in the contract, Team 1 submitted that 
this question of payment fell widiin the exclusive jurisdiction of die English courts. 
* -
(b) Proceedings before the English High Court 
Before die CRB had even convened its first meeting with the parties, Team 1 
commenced legal proceedings against the Driver in the English High Court for the 
termination payment which it claimed was due under the exit clause. The Driver 
applied to stay diese court proceedings on die ground tiiat die parties had 
submitted die matters in dispute to arbitration before die CRB. Team 1 opposed 
diis application on die basis diat die CRB's jurisdiction did not extend to issues 
such as the cause and consequences of the termination and diat the CRB 
proceedings did not, in any event, constitute 'arbitration'. In the submission of 
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Team 1, the CRB was merely a body empowered to decide the 'rules of the game', 
i.e. an internal body of the FIA applying technical sports rules. 
Thomas J of the English High Court found that the Driver's application gave 
rise to three issues: 
(1) Have the parties agreed to refer the subject matter of the court 
proceedings to the CRB? 
(2) If so, was the reference to the CRB a reference to arbitration or to 
something else? 
(3) If it was a reference to some other form of dispute resolution, should the 
court proceedings be stayed? 
With respect to the first issue, Thomas J held that the parties had not agreed to 
refer the dispute pending before the court to the CRB. In reaching this conclusion, 
the parties' intentions as expressed in the contract and related documents were 
examined. Thomas J found that, if it were necessary to determine whether one 
contract was terminated in order to decide on the priority between contracts, then 
such a determination was to be made by the CRB as an incidental issue, as 
expressly provided in the CRB rules. Otherwise, disputes relating to the 'rights and 
wrongs of termination' did not fall within the scope of the reference to the CRB. 
Given that there was no dispute between the parties that the contract with Team 1 
had been terminated, Thomas J found mat the CRB was not entided to consider 
the matter pending before the court. This finding was obviously sufficient to 
dismiss the application for a stay by the Driver. However, interestingly enough, 
Thomas J went on to consider the second issue regarding the nature of the CRB 
proceedings. After a very careful review, he held that die CRB proceedings 
constitute 'true arbitration'. Having reached this conclusion, it was not necessary to 
address the third and final issue. For arbitration practitioners, it is clearly the 
second question that is of particular interest. Accordingly, the following comments 
will focus on this question about the nature of arbitration. 
(c) Applicable Law 
Before turning to this question, one preliminary observation should be made 
about the applicable law. It was common ground in the English court proceedings 
that the characterization of the dispute resolution mechanism agreed upon was 
governed by the law of England and Wales.4 Due to the limited scope of this 
Similarly, with respect to the first issue, it was agreed by the two parties that the arbitrators' 'Kompetenz-
Kompetenz' under Swiss law, i.e. under the law of the seat of the arbitration, was irrelevant to the English 
court's determination of the arbitrators' jurisdiction over the subject matter of the court proceedings. 
Although historically correct under English law before 1997, this position is now almost certainly incorrect 
under the English Arbitration Act 1996. Pursuant to ss. 9(4) and 2(2)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996, an 
English court faced with an application for a stay of proceedings has jurisdiction to rule on die validity and 
scope of an arbitration agreement, even if the seat of the arbitration is outside England and Wales; but 
where a party disputing the arbitral jurisdiction is taking part in foreign arbitration proceedings where the 
tribunal has the power to determine its own jurisdiction (e.g. under Swiss law), it should not be able to short-
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contribution, we will not delve into this question of applicable law, but will only 
make the following brief comments. Faced with the defence that the parties had 
agreed to arbitrate in Switzerland, the English court should have applied Article 
11(3) of the New York Convention. There are divergent views on the law that 
governs the validity of an arbitration agreement under this provision, including the 
question whether an agreement is a true arbitration agreement. There are diree 
main possibilities: 
(1) the lex fori; 
(2) the law determined by the conflict rule of Article V(I)(a) applied by 
analogy, i.e. me law to which the parties have subjected the arbitration 
agreement or the law of the seat of the arbitration;5 and 
(3) the New York Convention itself, meaning that the term 'arbitration' used 
in Article II must be interpreted as an autonomous concept6 and 
according to general standards. 
It is only under the first possibility that one can justify die application of English 
law; and mis possibility is the least appropriate one in connection with the 
application of an international treaty. Under the other two possibilities, the English 
court should have applied either Swiss law as the law of the seat of the arbitration7 
or transnational standards based on a comparative review of the notion of 
arbitration.8 In our view, this last solution is the most appropriate, because it is the 
only one mat facilitates uniform application of the New York Convention. 
(d) 'Arbitration' 
Although unnecessary to dispose of the application for a stay, Thomas J - 'in view of 
the excellence of the arguments presented' - addressed the status of the CRB: is it 
an arbitral body? Is a reference to the CRB a reference to arbitration? In answering 
these questions, Thomas J did not rely on the language used by the parties, a 
language of administration rather than arbitration ('board' instead of 'tribunal', 
'board member' instead of 'arbitrator', 'meeting' instead of 'hearing', 'decision' 
instead of 'award'). Instead, Thomas J preferred - and righdy so - to examine the 
cont. 
circuit die arbitral process by bringing legal proceedings in the English courts before the arbitrators' ruling 
on jurisdiction. It cannot do so where die arbitration's seat is in England: see ss. 30, 70(2) and 72 of the 
1996 Act (V.V. Veeder, 'La nouvelle loi anglaise sur l'arbitrage de 1996: la naissance d'un magnifique 
elephant' in (1997) Rev. de l'Arb. 1997, p. 15; Antonia Dimolitsa, 'Autonomie et "Kompetenz-
Kompetenz'" in (1998) Rev. de l'Arb., 1998, p. 329. 
'
5
 Swiss Supreme Court, 21 March 199.5, ASA Bulletin 1996, pp. 25.5, 259-261. 
Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation 
(Boston, 1981), pp. 44-49. 
The parties had not expressly chosen a law to govern the arbitration agreement. 
At the same point, in addition to English law, the court mentioned the 'general principles ... common to all 
systems of arbitration'. To this extent, die court actually referred to uniform interpretation. However, in 
practice, the court then fell back, on the standards of the lex fori. The result would not have been different 
in this case, as in all three possibilities one must conclude that a true arbitration was at issue. 
182 Arbitration International Volume 17 Number 2 
substance of the CRB's function. To this end, a number of factors were considered, 
all of which address the arbitral nature of a dispute resolution process. These factors 
arose out of the parties' submissions and Musull and Boyd's definition of an 
arbitration.9 For our purposes, these factors may be grouped into four categories: 
(1) opportunity to be heard; 
(2) impartiality of the decision-makers; 
(3) characteristics of the decision; and 
(4) basis for jurisdiction. 
In its decision, the court considered three different aspects of the opportunity to 
be heard. First, the court noted that, in an arbitration, each party must have a 
proper opportunity to present its case, a requirement undoubtedly met by the 
actual procedure adopted by the CRB. Secondly, the court emphasized that, as a 
hallmark of any arbitral process, there should be proper and proportionate means 
for the receipt of evidence. This requirement implies that sufficient time is allowed 
for the production of expert evidence or for the appointment of a tribunal-
appointed expert, if this is necessary for the determination of the issues in the 
arbitration. It also means that the arbitral tribunal must grant the parties sufficient 
time for the submission of evidence and oral argument. A specific issue arose here 
because the Secretary of the CRB had indicated that the meeting would be limited 
to one day. Such a limitation would have been deemed to be incompatible with an 
arbitral process. However, the Secretary's statement was remedied by the willing-
ness of the CRB Tribunal to grant additional time if needed, as it did in fact. 
Thirdly and finally, Team 1 argued mat the three-day time-limit for rendering a 
decision following the meeting further demonstrated the summary nature of the 
proceedings, which was irreconcilable with arbitration. Thomas J dismissed this 
argument: all that was required was a speedy decision after the last meeting, not a 
hurried process before; the CRB rules did not restrict the number of meetings and 
the CRB was required to hold as many meetings as justice required. 
As to impartiality, the court also placed great emphasis on the fact that the CRB 
consists of lawyers of international standing, who are appointed by the President of 
the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce and who have 
no connection with the FLA or Formula 1 racing in general, all factors being a 'very 
important indication that the process is intended to be an arbitral one'. Similarly, the 
court noted that, in accordance with a fundamental principle of arbitration, the CRB 
arbitrators do not engage in unilateral communications with one party. 
As to the characteristics of the decision, as another factor pointing towards 
arbitration, the court relied on the CRB's duty to apply the law. Indeed, although 
the priority between two conflicting contracts is determined by a strict chrono-
logical rule according to which the contract first registered prevails, the CRB 
decides on the validity of the contracts in accordance with the proper governing 
Mustill and Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (London, 1989, 2nd edn.), 
p. 41. 
Formula 1 Racing and Arbitration 183 
law. In this context, Thomas J quoted from the following definition of arbitration 
set out in O'Callaghan v. Coral Racing Ltd:10 
The hallmark of the arbitration process is that it is a procedure to determine the legal rights and 
obligations of the parties judicially, with binding effect, which is enforceable in law, thus 
reflecting in private proceedings the role of a civil court of law. 
In this case, the court had no doubt that the CRB determined a matter that had 
legal consequences, i.e. which contract took precedence. While it was recognized 
that an arbitral tribunal may apply principles that are not 'stricdy legal', the court 
nevertheless found that the existence of an obligation to apply the law constitutes 
an important indication that the procedure at issue is an arbitration. A further 
characteristic of an arbitral decision is that it is binding on the parties and rendered 
upon a dispute between persons whose substantive rights are at issue. The court 
determined that this characteristic applies to the CRB decision. The existence of a 
dispute on the substance of the rights is obvious and the CRB rules expressly 
provide for the binding nature of the CRB's decision. 
Finally, the court considered the importance placed on consent in the definition 
of arbitration provided by Mustill and Boyd. Among other attributes of arbi-
tration,11 Mustill and Boyd emphasize that the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal 
must derive from the consent of the parties (or from an order of the court or from 
a statute), the terms of which make it clear that the process is to be an arbitration. 
The jurisdiction of the CRB is conferred by the contracts between the FIA and the 
teams and by those between the teams and the drivers. The fact that there is no 
bilateral contract between the teams does not matter, nor does - in Thomas J's 
words - the fact that 'these are contracts of adhesion and the parties have to assent 
thereto if they wish to participate in Formula 1 racing'. 
III. ASSESSMENT OF WALKINSHAWv. DINIZ 
In assessing the decision in Walkinshaw v. Diniz, we would like to focus on four 
specific points: 
(a) the conclusion reached by the English High Court in the light of 
comparative law; 
(b) the compulsory nature of the arbitration; 
(c) due process and the proper means for evidence-taking balanced against 
the need for speed; and 
English Court of Appeal, 19 November 1998 (unreported). 
In addition to its consensual nature, Mustill and Boyd's definition of arbitration includes the following 
attributes: the decision must be binding; the process is carried on between persons whose substantive rights 
are determined by the tribunal; the tribunal is chosen by the parties by a method accepted by them; the 
tribunal must act in an impartial manner respecting an equal obligation of fairness towards both parties; the 
agreement is enforceable in law; and the decision is made upon a dispute. The court concluded that all of 
these attributes were present in the case of the CRB. 
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(d) the split between arbitral and judicial jurisdiction. 
(a) Arbitration versus Something Else 
By all standards one may apply to define arbitration, the English High Court 
reached the correct conclusion in Walkinshawv. Diniz: the CRB procedure is true 
arbitration. A brief comparative law study supports this proposition. 
In 1993, the Swiss Supreme Court addressed the same issue with respect to 
proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter the 'CAS'), in 
Gundel v. The International Equestrian Federation (hereinafter the 'FEI').12 
Gundel was a horseman and a member of the German equestrian team. By 
virtue of his licence to compete, he became subject to the rules of the FEI. Under 
these rules, a competitor who is dissatisfied with a decision of the FEI is entitled to 
make a final appeal to the CAS, the arbitral institution located in Lausanne, 
Switzerland. The FEI had disqualified, suspended and fined Gundel following a 
positive doping test on his horse at a competition. Gundel appealed to the CAS. 
While the CAS has a set of procedural rules, it does not decide the disputes of this 
nature itself but rather sets up a panel entrusted with the resolution of the dispute. 
In the Gundel case, the CAS panel proceeded and eventually confirmed the 
disqualification, but reduced the period of suspension and the fine. Gundel then 
applied to the Swiss Supreme Court for the annulment of the CAS decision.13 
The Swiss Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over the application for 
annulment, provided that the CAS had decided on legal issues and not merely on 
the application of technical sports rules,14 and provided that the CAS decision was 
an arbitral award, as opposed to a decision of a sports body. 
The first requirement was clearly met: the suspension, disqualification and fine 
undoubtedly affected the competitor's legal interests. The second requirement 
gave rise to more discussion. Following a classical definition, the Swiss Supreme 
Court defined an arbitral award as a judgment rendered on the basis ot an 
arbitration agreement by a private tribunal to which the parties have entrusted the 
resolution of a dispute involving an economic interest.15 A decision by an internal 
body of a sports federation is not usually considered to be an arbitral award 
because such an internal body is seen to be a mere emanation of the sports 
federation rather than an independent judicial authority. Was the CAS such an 
12
 G v. Federation Equestre Internationale, Supreme Court, 15 March 1993, RO (Official Reporter) 119 II 
271; also reported in Digest of CAS Awards 1986-1998 (ed. Matdiieu Reeb) (Bern, 1998), p. 545, with an 
English translation, and commented on by Jan Paulsson, 'Arbitration of International Sports Disputes' in 
(1993) 9 Arbitration International 359. 
' O n the basis of art. 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act. 
On the difficulties which this distinction involves, see e.g. Margareta Baddeley, 'Une sentence d'tin interet 
particulier', ASA Bull. 1997, p. 143, and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 'Arbitration and the Games' in 
Mealey's International Arbitration Report (February 1997), pp. 20-29. 
l j
 The Swiss Supreme Court restated this definition of an arbitral award in connection with an international 
sports dispute involving a CAS award in an unreported decision of 31 March 1999, and in connection with a 
domestic arbitration, in a decision of 26 July 1999, RO (Official Reporter) 125 I 389. 
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independent judicial authority? The CAS was not an emanation of the FEI; nor 
was it subject to its control.16 Fifteen arbitrators out of the list of 60 from which the 
parties could choose were unconnected with any sports body; and the CAS rules 
provided for the challenge of any arbitrator who lacked the independence 
required under the Swiss arbitration law. On this basis, the Supreme Court came 
to the conclusion drat the CAS decision was an arbitral award and that it had 
jurisdiction over the annulment application. 
Although the focus of the analysis was different - for the Swiss Supreme Court: 
independence; for the English High Court: procedural rights - the conclusion was 
the same. Moreover, if one compares the Swiss Supreme Court's definition of 
'award' (together with the emphasis placed on independence and the need for a 
decision affecting legal rights) with the tests applied by the English High Court, it is 
quite clear that the definitions of arbitration largely coincide, but with one 
exception: the weight given to the parties' procedural right to present proper 
evidence, an issue we will return to later. 
A broader comparative law perspective confirms that both the Swiss and English 
courts were justified in concluding that the dispute resolution procedures under 
review were arbitral in nature. A number of legal systems distinguish between 
contractual and judicial arbitration: Italian law does so between arbitrato irrituale 
and arbitrato rituale; German law between Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit and Schiedsgu-
tachten; Swiss law between the same concepts as German law;17 Dutch law between 
arbitrage and bindend advies; French law between arbitrage contractuel and 
arbitrage juridictionnel. The test for distinguishing between the two different 
institutions is the binding nature of the decision that results from the process: 
contract-like or judgment-like. It is only if the parties intend a decision to be 
binding like a judgment that it constitutes an award and the process an 
arbitration.18 This condition was clearly satisfied in the case of the CRB, as it was 
for the CAS. 
Other types of connections, such as those previously existing between the CAS and the International 
Olympic Committee (which had created and financed the CAS) led the Swiss Supreme Court to qualify its 
decision: CAS proceedings constitute true arbitration at least where the IOC is not a party. This 
qualification in turn led to a reform of the CAS structure in 1994. See Court of Arbitration, Code of Sports-
related Arbitration, Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes and 
Paulsson, supra n. 12. 
In French, arbitrage and expertise-arbitrage or expertise arbitrale. 
For Italian law, Piero Bernardini, II Diritto dell'arbitrato (Rome, 1998), p. 17; for French law, Charles 
Jarrosson, La notion d'arbitrage (Paris, 1987), p. 162 et seq.; for German law, Klaus Peter Berger, 
Internationale Wirtschaftsschiedsgerichtsharkeit (Berlin/New York, 1992), pp. 53-54; for Swiss law, Felix 
Ehrat, in Internationales Privatrecht (ed. Honsell, Vogt and Schnyder) (Basle/Frankfurt, 1996), p. 1415; in 
connection with enforcement under the New York Convention, Albert Jan van den Berg, New York 
Convention of 1958, Consolidated Commentary: Cases Reported in Volumes XXII (1997)- XXIV (1999) 
[of the ICCA Yearbook], (forthcoming), which the author was kind enough to make available to the authors 
of this article. 
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(b) Compulsory versus Consensual Arbitration 
In Walkinshaw v. Diniz, the English High Court insisted that consent is a 
necessary basis for arbitration. Curiously, the court went on to hold that it was 
irrelevant that the parties in that case had no choice but to consent to arbitration or 
forego participation in the Formula 1 Championship. Consent is the classical 
foundation of arbitration.19 In reality, the CRB proceedings are a good illustration 
of a growing new category of arbitration without consent. Admittedly, the parties 
had executed a contract embodying an arbitration clause. However, when agreeing 
to arbitration, they had no choice: the 'acceptance' of arbitration was a condition 
sine qua non for admission to the motor-racing season. 
More and more, the classical concept of arbitration based on consent is being 
supplemented by other concepts of arbitration which largely ignore this 
requirement. This is so especially in the areas of sport,20 consumer transactions,21 
and investment arbitrations based on treaties or national statutes.22 This is only 
natural, as arbitration becomes the most common method for setding international 
disputes. One may choose to cling to the dogma of consent and when no true and 
meaningful consent exists, rely on a fiction of consent. But if we merely preserve 
the appearance of consent, this justification for arbitration is no longer compelling. 
Indeed, it may be more accurate and intellectually honest to simply admit that 
arbitration without consent exists. Having made that admission, one can then 
investigate the requirements that have come to replace consent. Are there any? 
What are they? Simply the fairness of the process? Or others? Which ones? It 
seems clear that this type of investigation is more likely to identify the true forces at 
play and thus protect the interests of the arbitration users more effectively than 
insisting on an obsolete dogma. 
(c) Due Process versus Speed 
The English High Court decision in Walkinshaw v. Diniz places great weight on 
the parties' right to present evidence: '[t]he Contract Recognition Board has to 
hold as many meetings as [justice] required'. Thomas J appears to imply that the 
1
 The Swiss Supreme Court also mentions it as part of the definition of an award. It does not address consent 
any further hecause this point was not at issue. 
20
 On mandatory sports arbitration and the effects on the validity of the arbitration clause, sec e.g. Stephan 
Netzle, 'Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals in Sports Matters: Arbitration Agreements by Reference to 
Regulations of Sports Organizations', in Arbitration of Sports-Related Disputes (ASA Special Series No. 11, 
1998), p. 4,5 ef seq., especially pp. ,53-.54. 
21
 Anne Brafford, 'Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap for the Weak 
and Unwary' in 21 Iowa]. Corp. L. 331, with numerous citations. 
12
 It is true tiiat the arbitration provision in the treaty/statute can be construed as an offer to arbitrate and the 
initiation of the arbitration as an acceptance. However, this is somewhat strained reasoning and, in any 
event, 'this puts the requirement of mutual consent in a new light, far removed from traditional contractual 
conceptions of arbitrations': see Antonio Parra, 'Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in 
Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment' in 
(1997) 12 Foreign Investment Ijtw Journal 360; Jan Paulsson, 'Arbitration without Privity' in (199.5) 10 
Foreign Investment Law Journal 232. 
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adoption of a court-like procedure is an indication of the parties' intent to agree on 
arbitration and not on something else. 
(i) How much due process is enough? 
In a time-driven arbitration, insistence on a broad opportunity to present evidence 
begs the inevitable question: how much can one expedite arbitration without 
risking a violation of due process? The requirement of due process is so 
fundamental fhat it has been deemed to be part of transnational or truly 
international public policy.23 A survey of over 50 court decisions from countries 
around the world24 shows that due process is one of the most common grounds for 
challenging arbitration awards. All of these cases dealt with alleged violations of 
due process specifically relating to the right to present evidence, including the right 
to have an expert appointed by the arbitral tribunal and to state one's case on the 
expert evidence.2,5 In over 10 per cent of these decisions, the courts either 
annulled the arbitration awards or refused to enforce them.26 This is a high 
percentage, considering that the overall ratio of non-enforcement under the New 
York Conventions lies below 5 per cent.27 At the same time, almost none of the 
decisions annulling awards or refusing enforcement comes as a surprise to any 
experienced arbitrator. 
This survey highlights the following main points: courts often insist on an 
arbitral tribunal's wide latitude to conduct the arbitration.28 Though they hold that 
a party is entitled to present witnesses and documents on relevant facts (and to 
have an expert appointed by the arbitral tribunal if the latter lacks technical 
knowledge necessary to resolve the dispute),29 courts are reluctant to interfere with 
the arbitrator's assessment of relevancy.30 In addition, courts sometimes insist on 
the fact that the parties must offer their evidence within the time and in the form 
Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration (ICCA 
Congress Series No. 3, 1986), pp. 299-300; Charles Jarrosson, 'L'arbitrage et la Convention europeenne 
des droits de I'liomme', (1989) Rev. de l'Arb., p. 600; Bruno Oppetit, 'Le refus d'execution d'une sentence 
arbitrale etrangere dans le cadre de la Convention de New York', (1971) Rev. de l'Arb., p. 104; other 
authors speak of principles fundamental to all systems of justice, universally recognized principles and the 
like (see in particular Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter and Murray Smith, The Law and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration (London, 1991 2nd edn.), p . 293; Matthieu de Boisseson, Le droit 
t'rancais de l'arbitrage interne et international (Paris, 1990), p. 676; Catherine Kessedjian, 'Principe de la 
contradiction et arbitrage', (199.5) Rev. de l'Arb. p. 382). 
Carried out by the First author of this article, so far unpublished. 
'' Be it the evidence of the expert produced by the other party or appointed bv the arbitral tribunal. 
26
 Under Article V(l)(b) or (d) and V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. 
Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention: Its Intended Effects, Its Interpretation, Salient 
Problem Areas (ASA Special Series No. 9, August 1996), p . 25. 
28
 e.g. Genericav. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc, 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997), YB Comm. Arb. XXIII 
(1998), p. 1076. 
29
 Swiss Supreme Court, 14 November 1991, RO (Official Reporter) 116 11 639 - YB Comm. Arb. XVII 
(1992) pp. 279, 282 - ASA Bull. 1991, pp. 262, 266; Swiss Supreme Court, 11 May 1992, ASA Bull. 1992, 
pp. 381, 397. 
3
" e.g. The Argo Leader, S.D.N.Y. 1985, YB Comm. Arb. XII (1987), pp. 173, 175; Court of Appeal Paris, 
21 January 1997, (1997) Rev. de l'Arb. pp . 429, 431, Comment Yves Derains; Court of Appeal Paris, 14 
October 1993, (1994) Rev. de l'Arb. p. 380, Comment Pierre Bellet. 
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required by the applicable rules or decided by the tribunal.31 Courts also take into 
account not only the particular circumstances of the case, but also the specific type 
of arbitration involved, for instance GAFTA arbitrations.32 As a result, some 
courts have held that the standard for due process is lower for quality 
arbitrations,33 which are similar in some respects to sports arbitrations. The 
similarities are primarily found in the strict time constraints and relatively simple 
issues that are often to be resolved (Are the goods in acceptable condition? Must 
the athlete be disqualified?). Blatant violations will not be accepted: hidden 
evidence, be it documents or expert reports that are not communicated to one 
of the parties, will result in courts annulling awards or refusing to enforce 
them;34 the same is true if a party is not given an opportunity to comment upon an 
expert report35 or on documents filed by its opponent.36 This is equally so if the 
arbitral tribunal has refused to take evidence which is pertinent and material.37 
When considering the degree of due process required in any particular case, 
this survey of court decisions shows that an arbitral tribunal must pay attention to 
any mandatory rules at the place of arbitration. Although there is broad consensus 
on the core principles of due process, there are some important differences in its 
implementation between legal systems.38 
31
 Swiss Supreme Court, 21 August 1990, ASA Bull. 1991, pp. 30, 32. 
32
 Court of Appeal Hamburg, 26 January 1989, YB Comm. Arb. XVII (1992), pp. 491, 496; German 
Supreme Court, 18 January 1990, YB Comm. Arb. XVII (1992), pp. 503, 506; German Supreme Court, 26 
April 1990, YB Comm. Arb. XXI (1996), pp. .532, .534. 
33
 Court of Appeal Paris, 30 January 1992, (1993) Rev. de l'Arb. p. I l l , Comment Charles Jarrosson, p. 112; 
Court of Appeal Paris, 16 February 1996, (1997) Rev. de l'Arb. pp. 244, 245, Comment Serve Guinchard, 
entitled 'L'arbitrage et le respect du contradictoire (a propos de quelques decisions rendues en 1996)', it 
being understood that French case law considers quality arbitrations to be 'a mi-chemin entre arbitrage et 
expertise'. 
Court of Appeal Hong Kong, Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd., 16 January 
1998, YB Comm. Arb. XXIII (1998), pp. 666, 681-682; French Cour de cassation, 16 December 1985, 
(1987) Rev. de l'Arb. p. 390 (witness 'testimonies' not known to either party); see also Lalive, supra n. 23 at 
p. 300 with citations. 
3
 Court of Appeal Hong Kong, Apex Tech Investments Ltd. v. Chuang's Development (China) Ltd., 15 
March 1996 (unreported), discussed in Judith O'Hare, 'The Denial of Due Process and the Enforceability 
of CIETAC Awards under the New York Convention' in (1996) J. Int'l Arb. 179, at p. 193 and Neil 
Kaplan, A Case by Case Examination of whether National Courts Apply Different Standards when Assisting 
Arbitral Proceedings and Enforcing Awards in International Cases as Contrasting with Domestic Disputes. 
Is There a Worldwide Trend Towards Supporting an International Arbitration Culture? (ICCA Congress 
Series No. 8, 1998), pp. 187, 205; Supreme Court Hong Kong, Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East 
Asia Ltd., 15 January 1993, YB Comm. Arb. XIX (1994), pp. 664, 671. 
36
 Court of Appeal, The Hague, 28 April 1998, and President Arrondissementsrechtbank, The Hague, 2 
October 1997, YB Comm. Arb. XXIII (1998), p. 731. 
37
 Iran Aircraft Ind. v. Avco Corp., 980 Fed 2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992), YB Comm. Arb. XVIII (1993), pp. .596, 
601-602; Swiss Supreme Court, 22 December 1992, ASA Bull. 1996, pp. 646, 650; Tempo Shain Corp. v. 
Bertek, Inc., No. 96-9471, 2nd Cir., Mealey's Arbitration Report 1997, A-2. 
38
 The right to an oral hearing is one example. Under art. 24(1) of the UNCITRAL Model I^ aw, a party has 
the right to an oral hearing if it so requests. Under other regimes, the arbitrators may decide to have a 
hearing in their discretion (see e.g. s. 34(2)(h) of the English Arbitration Act 1996; Swiss Supreme Court 
decision, 1 July 1991, RO (Official Reporter) 117 11 346). Another difference arises in connection with 
tribunal-appointed experts. Under some laws, the parties have a right to examine the expert at an oral 
hearing (art. 26(2) Model Law; art. 1042(4) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure), whilst it is sufficient under 
others that they have an opportunity to comment on the report. 
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(ii) How much speed? 
Can these due process requirements be waived so as to speed up the course of die 
arbitration? There is no question that parties can waive their due process rights 
after the fact. Indeed, it is a generally accepted rule that if a party does not 
immediately object to a violation of due process, it is precluded from subsequendy 
challenging the award on this ground. However, what if the parties seek to limit 
due process in advance, e.g. by agreeing on procedural rules for an accelerated 
arbitration which limit their right to present evidence? This is legally doubtful 
because of the public policy nature of due process. Whatever the general answer, 
it is clear that a waiver of procedural rights in advance would not be effective in the 
context of compulsory arbitration; consent and due process are too closely linked. 
Compulsory arbitration can only be justified if the process imposed by one party 
on the other is fair, which implies the respect of due process rights. 
(Hi) Balance and flexibility 
Any fast-track arbitration, be it in the area of sport or otherwise, must strike the 
difficult balance between due process and speed. Any rules for accelerated 
proceedings must allow for the risk of a decision that will not withstand judicial 
review. If the relevant evidence cannot be adduced within the short time frame 
allowed, the rules must provide for some fallback procedure, especially in any 
arbitration scheme where there is no real consent to arbitrate. For instance, this is 
true for the CAS Olympic rules, which provide for a resolution within 24 hours, 
but allow not only an extension of that time-limit, but also a transfer of the case 
from the fast-track to the regular procedure. Indeed, the arbitrators have a choice 
between making a final fast-track award or transferring the case: 
Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the claimant's request for relief, 
the nature and complexity of the dispute, die urgency of its resolution, the extent of the 
evidence required and of the legal issues to be resolved, the parties' right to be heard and the 
state of the record at die end of the [fast track] proceedings.39 
In practice, the CAS Olympic arbitrators have not taken advantage of this 
possibility thus far. However, the very fact of its existence is essential to the fairness 
of the process. 
The insistence on due process should not mislead the practitioner. Like any 
manifestation of public policy, due process is a variable concept. And, indeed, the 
courts adjust their standards of review in accordance with the specificities of the 
arbitration at issue. If a decision is required urgently, the arbitrators have a duty to 
proceed expeditiously. As a corollary, the parties have a duty to co-operate with the 
arbitrators in achieving this end. If the parties are entided to an expert, an expert 
must be appointed. However, proceedings involving the expert can be condensed 
into a very short time frame. So, for instance, in Olympic arbitration, the parties are 
See art. 20 CAS Arbitration Rules for the Games of the XXVII Olympiad in Sydney. 
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invited to comment on the choice of the expert within hours, the expert is examined 
orally, and the parties' comments on the expert evidence are due immediately or 
shortly thereafter. When giving such directions, it will obviously be up to the 
arbitrators to decide on the appropriate limits for such accelerated proceedings. 
(d) Partial versus Plenary Jurisdiction 
The case of Walkinshaw v. Diniz is a good illustration of the complications mat 
may arise out of split jurisdiction. Under the CRB rules, most disputes involving a 
conflict between drivers' contracts may have to be resolved through bodi CRB 
arbitration proceedings and court proceedings. Needless to say, such a split 
jurisdiction generates extra expense, delay, and a fair share of procedural niceties. 
To avoid these unpleasant consequences, the FIA should consider extending the 
CRB's jurisdiction to the contractual consequences of one contract prevailing over 
anomer. This would necessitate some creative rule drafting.40 The proceedings 
would have to be divided into two stages. The first stage would deal with contract 
priority. It would have to be particularly speedy. The second stage would then deal 
with the consequences thereof and would not necessarily have to proceed on a fast 
track. 
Such an extension of the CRB's jurisdiction would have a number of advantages 
and no obvious drawbacks. Some advantages are specific to the CRB process; 
others are general advantages of arbitration over court litigation. Among the 
specific advantages, one can count: 
(1) avoiding the problem of delineating the jurisdiction of the CRB from that 
of a state court; 
(2) avoiding, or at least reducing, the risk of duplicative and conflicting 
proceedings before an arbitral tribunal and a court, with the attendant 
costs and time involved in procedural battles on arbitration, lis pendens 
and res iudicata defences;41 and 
(3) reducing the costs and duration of the dispute resolution process due to 
the fact that it is concentrated in one rather than two proceedings. 
At the same time, the FIA may contemplate modifying the 'administrative' terminology used in the CRB 
rules to replace 'board' by 'arbitral tribunal', 'member of the board' by 'arbitrator', 'meeting' by 'hearing' 
and so on. This would minimize the risk that courts and parties unfamiliar with CRB proceedings would be 
misled about the true nature of the process. 
This case illustrates a situation of conflict between courts and arbitration, which is occurring more and more 
as arbitration becomes the preferred mode of settling international disputes and disputes become 
increasingly complex, involving multiple parties, multiple contracts, and multiple proceedings. The conflict 
can also arise between two competing arbitrations. As in court proceedings (see e.g. art. 21 of die Brussels 
and Lugano Conventions on Jurisdiction and die Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters), it will become necessary to establish rules for resolving these conflicts, in order to avoid 
duplicative proceedings and conflicting decisions on the same dispute. On the conflicts between courts and 
arbitral tribunals seized of the same disputes, see Francois Perret, 'Parallel Actions Pending Before an 
Arbitral Tribunal and a State Court: The Solution under Swiss Law' in (2000) 16 Arbitration International 
237. See also Douglas D. Reichert, 'Problems with Parallel and Duplicate Proceedings: The Litispendence 
Principle and International Litigation' in (1992) 8 Arbitration International 237; Michael E. Schneider, 
'Multi-Fora Disputes' in (1990) 6 Arbitration International 101. 
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Widi respect to general advantages of extending the jurisdiction of the CRB, it 
would: 
(4) ensure confidentiality,42 which is not a minor benefit when dealing with 
highly sensitive commercial matters; 
(5) allow flexibility in the management of the dispute resolution process; 
(6) guarantee the quality of justice due to the experience and qualifications of 
the arbitrators, which is not necessarily available in court proceedings; and 
(7) permit the development of uniform practice due to the permanent nature 
of the CRB. 
In conclusion, viewed from a broader perspective, the CRB system illustrates a 
characteristic peculiar to the evolution of contemporary disputes resolution 
procedures. It is a good example of a growing trend towards the creation of tailor-
made mechanisms meeting the specific needs of a given trade, industry or other 
activity. 
The CRB provides a fully integrated, self-enforcing system for dispute 
avoidance and dispute resolution, one which is tailored to the distinct 
requirements of the activity giving rise to the dispute. As such, the CRB could 
well serve as a model in all other sports disciplines where athletes often move from 
team to team. In the first instance, the system seeks to prevent disputes by 
requiring contract registration. To the extent that disputes do arise, it greatly 
simplifies their resolution by setting rules on contract priority. As a result, tlie CRB 
Tribunal is able to rule on disputes over contract priority with the greatest speed 
and certainty possible. Traditional dispute resolution procedures, including 
arbitration, would not allow for the decision-making speed required by the time 
constraints of competition. The CRB system ensures prompt compliance with the 
CRB Tribunal decisions through the licensing procedures of the FIA, a supra 
partes body, witliout die need for recourse to die courts. All of this results in a 
unique dispute resolution procedure that can keep pace with the demands of the 
speediest participants in the Formula 1 Championship. 
Admittedly with the exceptions known in arbitration: .see e.g. L. Yves Fortier, 'The Occasionally 
Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality' in (1999)1.3 Arbitration International 131; Jan Paulsson and 
Nigel Rawding, 'The Trouble with Confidentiality' in (199.5) 11 Arbitration International 303. 
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MR. JUSTICE THOMAS: There is before the court an application by the defendant, 
Mr. Diniz, to stay these proceedings brought against him by the Claimants ("Arrows") 
under s. 9 of me Arbitration Act 1996 on the basis that the parties had agreed to refer the 
matters in dispute to arbitration under the contract between them. 
The contract between Mr. Diniz and Arrows and the Formula One 1997 Concorde 
Agreement. 
On 24th October 1997 Arrows, owners and operators of the Arrows Formula One 
racing team, entered into a contract with Mr. Diniz, a professional Formula One racing 
driver, under which Mr. Diniz would drive for them during the 1998 and 1999 Formula 
One World Motor Racing Car Championships. 
Formula One World Motor Racing Car Championships are governed by the 1997 
Concorde Agreement. That is an agreement to which all Formula One racing teams and 
the Federation Internationale de l'Automobile are parties. The structure of the 
arrangements are such that agreements are also made between drivers and each team 
individually, and the agreement to which I have referred between Mr. Diniz and Arrows 
was one such agreement. 
That agreement set out the respective obligations of the parties. Among the obligations 
of Arrows was the provision of a car, and a spare car, to a standard warranted under clause 
7 of the agreement. The termination provisions of the agreement were contained in 
clause 9. Two of those provisions are relevant. Clause 9 reads: 
"9.2 This agreement may be earlier terminated, by means of a 1,5-day prior notice, via 
telefax, in the following events . . . " 
I need not set out (a). I set out (b): 
"by the Driver, upon failure of the Team to fulfil its obligations undertaken in clause 3; 
or in the event the Team has not met the minimum performance standards set out in 
Clauses 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 above." 
Clause 9.5 provided: 
"9.5 Either party may terminate this Agreement for any reason at the enel of the 1998 
season upon giving to the other not less than 7 days notice in writing before the end of 
the 1998 Formula One season, subject to paying to tire party receiving the notice the 
sum of US $7,000,000 upon the termination of this Agreement." 
To enable Mr. Diniz to compete in Formula One racing the contract had to be registered 
by a body called "The Contract Recognition Board" (established under the terms of the 
1997 Concorde Agreement) by sending to uiat body the contract and the contract 
registration form. 
The Concorde Agreement also required each contact between the driver and his team 
to contain a provision for the resolution of conflicts by the Contract Recognition Board. 
This provision was incorporated into the contract between Mr. Diniz and Arrows by the 
first part of clause 11. Clause 11 read as follows: 
"11.1 The Parties hereto expressly agree that this Agreement is (or as the case may be, 
forms a part of) a Contract as defined by Clause 6(1) of Schedule 11 to the Concorde 
Agreement so that the Parties hereto hereby agree with each other to respect the terms 
of the said Schedule and in particular Clause 7 thereof which provides for the 
resolutions of conflicts by the Contract Recognition Board sitting in Geneva, 
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Switzerland. Accordingly the Parties hereto expressly submit to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of any competent judicial or other body as regards interim or conservatory 
measures in that respect. 
11.2 Subject to Clause 11.1 this Agreement shall be governed by English Law and shall 
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England." 
Clause 11.1 is the clause which was required to be inserted into the agreement by the 
terms of the 1997 Concorde Agreement. It will be necessary later to refer in more detail to 
the terms of Schedule 11 to the Concorde Agreement. I am told by the parties that this can 
be considered as a self-standing document without reference to the 1997 Concorde 
Agreement itself. That document was not before the court and is a document of immense 
commercial confidentiality. 
I should record at this stage that it is the contention of Mr. Diniz that the Contract 
Recognition Board is an arbitral body and not, as Arrows contend, merely a body to 
decide on the "rules of the game". 
In accordance with those provisions, on 11th November 1997 the agreement between 
Mr. Diniz and Arrows was registered by the Contract Recognition Board. 
The termination of the agreement between Mr. Diniz and Arrows. 
On 6th October 1998 Mr. Diniz gave Arrows notice that Arrows had not complied with 
the minimum performance guarantees and warranties in clause 7 of the Agreement and 
that he was exercising the rights under clause 9.2(b) to terminate it at the end of the 1998 
season. That season ended with the Formula One race in Japan on 1st November 1998. 
On a day later, 7th October 1998, a press release was issued by the Sauber Formula One 
Racing Team to announce that Mr. Diniz would join their team as a driver for the 1999 
season. 
On 13th October 1998 Arrows wrote to Mr. Diniz stating they rejected his claim to be 
entitled to terminate under clause 9.2(b) for breach of the performance guarantees under 
clause 7. The letter continued, 
"Nonetheless, your fax, coupled with the fact that you appear to have agreed to drive 
for Sauber next year instead of Arrows, leaves me with no alternative but to accept that 
you have given formal notice in writing, as you are entided to do under Clause 9.5 of 
the Agreement, to terminate it. 
There are two consequences of early termination of the Agreement; first, all 
sponsorship agreements generated by you, including the Parmalat sponsorship, are also 
terminated (Clause 9.3) - although all outstanding payments still have to be met; and 
secondly, termination under Clause 9.5 is subject to the party giving notice - you -
paying die party receiving the notice - us - die sum of US 87 million upon termination 
of the Agreement. Since bom your notice and the termination of all sponsorship 
agreements generated by you take effect at die end of die season, please advise me as 
soon as possible of the arrangements you are making for this sum to be remitted." 
There could, in my view, be no doubt, after receipt of diis letter, that die agreement was 
terminated and that neidier Mr. Diniz nor Arrows were seeking to continue the agreement 
for die 1999 season. 
On 20di October 1998 Mr. Diniz entered into a contract with PP Sauber Limited of St. 
Helierjersey ("Sauber") for the 1999 season with an option for a furmer year. The period 
of fhat contract, in accordance witii its terms, began on 21st November 1998. That 
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agreement is governed by Swiss law with an ICC Arbitration clause with the seat of 
arbitration in Geneva. It contains, as is to be expected, a provision identical to Clause 11.1 
of the agreement between Arrows and Mr. Diniz. 
On 12th November 1998 Mr. Diniz sent a further letter to Arrows stating diat he had 
not terminated under clause 9.5 and relying on a furfher breach of clause 7 of the 
agreement as additional grounds for his termination under clause 9.2(b). 
On 17fh November the solicitors for Arrows made it clear in a further letter to Mr. 
Diniz that fhe agreement had been terminated and demanded payment of the sum of 
US$7 million due under clause 9.5. That letter was acknowledged on 20th November 
1998 by Herbert Smith, solicitors on Mr. Diniz's behalf. They did not dispute that the 
agreement was terminated but denied liability to pay US$7 million. Again, the demand 
made by Arrows was only consistent with Arrows accepting that the agreement had been 
terminated. 
The involvement of the Contract Recognition Board 
On 27th November 1998 Sauber apparendy sent the contract between diem and Mr. 
Diniz, and the registration form, to the Contract Recognition Board as they were required 
to do so that fhe contract could be registered. This was apparendy received by the Contract 
Recognition Board secretariat on 30fh November 1998. Under the terms of Schedule 11 it 
is the function of the Contract Recognition Board to determine priority as between any 
contracts for the services of the same driver that cover the same period of time. 
In accordance with the terms of clause 7.3 of Schedule 11, the Secretary of the Contract 
Recognition Board, on receipt of Sauber's form which showed that Mr. Diniz' services as a 
driver covered the same period as that in the contract between Mr. Diniz and Arrows, 
registered the contract and the form, but gave Sauber notice, on 8th December 1998, of 
apparendy conflicting contracts. He asked the parties to inform die Secretariat if drey 
wished for a meeting wifh the Contract Recognition Board to resolve the conflict between 
the two contracts. At some date between 8fh and 15th December 1998 negotiations took 
place between Arrows and Sauber. They were not successful. On 15th December 1998, in 
accordance with the time limit specified by the Secretary of the Contract Recognition 
Board, Sauber gave notice of its desire for a meeting wifh the Contract Recognition Board. 
The issue of proceedings in England and Wales by Arrows 
On 16th December 1998 Arrows issued these proceedings. The writ was endorsed with 
a statement of claim which was concisely and clearly drafted by Miss Monique Allan. It 
stated, after setting out the exchange of correspondence on 6th and 7fh October, quite 
unambiguously, the following: 
"8 . By virtue of the aforesaid termination the sum of US$7 million became due on 1 
November 1998 and is owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs pursuant to Clause 9.5 
of die Contract. 
9. Further or alternatively, in breach of Clause 9.5 of the Contract the Defendant has 
failed to pay the Plaintiffs US$7 million or any sum. 
10. In the premises, the Plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage in the sum of US$7 
million. 
11. Further the Plaintiffs claim interest on US$ 7 million. . . . " 
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The prayer continued: 
" . . . AND the Plaintiffs claim: 
(i) US$7 million; further alternatively, 
(ii) damages; further, 
(iii) interest . . . " 
The only basis for the claim of US$7 million made in that statement of claim was that the 
agreement between Mr. Diniz and Arrows had been terminated. Again, mere could be no 
doubt that Arrows accepted that the contract between Arrows and Diniz had been 
terminated. The write was sent to Mr. Diniz' solicitors, Herbert Smith, who replied on 
18th December 1998 that they did not have instructions to accept service. 
The convening of a Contract Recognition Board meeting 
Under the provisions of clauses 1 and 2 of Schedule 11 to the Concorde Agreement, 
die members of the Contract Recognition Board who were to determine the question of 
conflicting contracts were to be qualified lawyers of international standing, suitably 
experienced in the law of contract, and were to be appointed by the President of die Court 
of die International Chamber of Commerce. In accordance widi tiiose provisions, die 
President of tiiat Court appointed Professor Awocado Gabriel Crespi Reghizzi of Milan, 
Maitre Yves Derains of Paris and Mr. V.V. Veeder Q.C. of London as the diree members 
of the Board. Maitre Derain subsequendy resigned and in his place the President 
appointed Maitre de Boisseson, also of Paris. The diree members of the Board are all 
lawyers of the highest international standing and distinction. By the terms of clause 4 of 
Schedule 11, die Contract Recognition Board was to meet for these purposes in Geneva. 
On 21st January 1999 the Secretariat of die Contract Recognition Board informed 
Arrows, Mr. Diniz and Sauber mat a meeting of die Contract Recognition Board would be 
held on Friday, 12di February 1999 in Geneva. It requested that die parties send a 
complete file of their position and supporting documents to the diree members of the 
Contract Recognition Board by 5th February 1999. 
The parties all made submissions in accordance with this direction. Arrows made tiieir 
submissions on 5di February 1999. They challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and 
made it very clear that diey would not accept die jurisdiction of the Contract Recognition 
Board to decide die issue which was die subject of die proceeding in tiiis court. It will be 
necessary to refer to sub-paragraphs of that submission in due course. 
They also made allegations of bias against die Contract Recognition Board and failures 
in its procedure, but I should record that no suggestion of bias of any kind was pursued 
before me. 
Mr. Diniz also made submissions. He also contended that die agreement had been 
terminated and contended mat that had happened under clause 9.2(b). However, it was 
said on his behalf in para. 3 of die submission, as follows: 
"In addition, and witiiout prejudice to the aforesaid, in any event [Arrows] and [tiieir] 
lawyers have respectively, in [dieir] fax dated October 13, 1998 and in dieirs dated 
November 17, 199[8] (...) confirmed that die Agreement was terminated, aldiough 
they disagree in respect of the basis of such termination. They indeed allege (which is 
totally [denied] by Diniz) that this is on the basis of clause 9.5 of die Agreement, stating 
that die consequence tiiereof would be the obligation of Diniz to pay a certain amount. 
They themselves therefore accept tiiat such payment would be die consequence and 
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not the cause of die termination. This in ofher words means that, in any event, even if 
die termination is based on such clause 9.5, the Agreement is already terminated. 
Accordingly [Arrows] diemselves are not claiming that they are entitled to - or willing -
die driving services of Diniz during die 1999 season. There is tiierefore no conflict 
whatsoever in respect of me team for whom Diniz should drive in 1999. The only valid 
agreement in respect of his services is diat entered into with Sauber. [Arrows) only 
allege that, widiout prejudice to die already effective termination of die Agreement, they 
are entided to a certain payment. Diniz, again, disagrees, but, assuming that die CRB 
would not admit fhat the Agreement has been terminated based on clauses 9.2(b) and/ 
or 1.3 thereof, this is a matter which will be discussed in front of die ordinary 
competent courts where [Arrows] have indeed already started litigation against Diniz." 
There could be no doubt from that submission that Mr. Diniz accepted diat he 
understood that Arrows accepted diat die contract had been terminated, and diere was no 
contention on the part of Arrows that it subsisted or that he was required to drive for them 
after its termination. 
On 12fh February 1999 die Contract Recognition Board met in Geneva. Arrows did 
not attend. They had put in a further submission on 1 ldi February on the merits subject to 
that clear reservation on the jurisdiction of die arbitrators. They had also notified the Con-
tract Recognition Board that tiiey would not attend. On 17di February 1999 die Contract 
Recognition Board issued its decision. The operative order is set out in para. 46 in die 
following terms: 
"I - The T w o I s sues : We decide finally diat die TWR/Arrows Contract of 24 
October 1997 was validly terminated before 30 November 1998 in accordance with its 
terms and its applicable law; diat the Sauber Contract dated 20 October 1998 is valid 
and in force for die 1999 season; fhat it is the prevailing contract; and that it was validly 
registered by die CRB Secretariat on 30 November 1998. 
II - The CRB Regis try: W e direct the CRB Secretariat forthwith to modify the 
CRB register to reflect tliis decision, i.e. to remove die registration of the TWR/ 
Arrows Contract as applying to any period after 30 November 1998 and to accord die 
Sauber Contract die status of die prevailing contract. 
III - Other Mat ters : In this decision, we do not decide die two matters described in 
paragraph 4.5 above, for which we have directed a further meeting with further 
submissions from the Driver and TWR/Arrows, as set out in paragraph 37 above." 
Paragraph 45 stated: 
"45. In this decision, we have expressly left over die factual question of which 
contractual term was invoked validly to terminate the TWR/Arrows Contract, namely 
whether it was Clause 9(2)(b) or Clause 9(5): see paragraphs 33-37 above. We have 
also expressly left over the question of our jurisdiction in die limited sense described in 
paragraph 37 above." 
In order to understand diis reservation, it is necessary, briefly, to refer to other paragraphs 
of die decision. In para. 32 die Board said: 
"In our view it is plain diat the TWR/Arrows Contract has been validly terminated. 
Until the written submissions made by TWR/Arrows in these proceedings, that was 
clearly die position of bodi die Driver and TWR/Arrows, as expressed in writing by 
Mr. Walkinshaw, Simmons & Simmons and die writ's learned pleader. Moreover, in 
our view, that was indeed die legal position judged objectively from the contemporary 
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documents. Against mat weight of material, the written submissions from TWR/Arrows 
in these proceedings, to the effect that die TWR/Arrows Contract remains extant, count 
for nothing: see paragraphs 32 and 33 of Kingsford Stacey Blackwell's letter of 5 
February 1999. Accordingly, we decide fhat the TWR/Arrows Contract was terminated 
before 30 November 1990, either by virtue of Clause 9(2)(b) or 9(5)." 
They decided fhat, as a matter of fairness, they would adjourn the matter to allow Arrows 
to attend and make submissions as to whether they had jurisdiction to decide the issue, 
and they gave further direction for the hearing of fhat point. They said, in paras. 34, 35 and 
36: 
"34. As a matter of fairness to TWR/Arrows, given the sum of money apparently 
turning indirecdy on the answer to this issue [a reference to whether the contract had 
been terminated under clause 9.2(b) or clause 9.5] we think it is wrong to proceed in 
TWR/Arrows' absence without giving it anofher opportunity to attend a further CRB 
meeting where it could present evidence and argument in support of its case, provided 
that no irreparable prejudice from such a delay is thereby inflicted upon the Driver or 
Sauber. 
35. As to wasted or duplicated costs associated with a second meeting, we consider that 
the Driver and Sauber can be protected by a suitable order for costs in this decision. As 
to the imminence of the first race of the 1999 season at Melbourne on 7 March 1999, 
we consider that the Driver and Sauber can be sufficiently protected by a decision fhat 
recognises the early termination of the TWR/Arrows Contract, without also deciding 
which contractual term was in fact invoked to produce such termination. Whereas the 
registration of the Sauber Contract as the prevailing contract is of urgent interest to the 
Driver and Sauber, the same cannot be said of our decision as to which of two 
contractual provisions brought about the early termination of the TWR/Arrows 
Contract. 
36. Accordingly, we decide finally that the TWR/Arrows Contract was validly 
terminated in accordance with its terms before 30 November 1998. W e therefore 
also decide fhat the Sauber Contract is the prevailing contract; and we direct tire CRB 
Secretariat to [do so]." 
Although diey had set out, in para. 33 which I have not read in full, what must be treated as 
their preliminary view fhat the Contract Recognition Board had jurisdiction to decide 
whedier the TWR/Arrows contract was terminated under clause 9.2(b) or clause 9.5, they 
set out in para. 37 their directions in respect of the issue fhat diey consider they should 
determine, namely whether mey had jurisdiction to determine the question whedier die 
termination was under clause 9.2(b) or clause 9.5 and the merits of fhat dispute, assuming 
diat diey came, subsequendy, to the view diat they had jurisdiction. 
Following that decision Arrows' solicitors asked the Contract Recognition Board if fhey 
would decide die issue of jurisdiction first and dien determine, at the subsequent hearing, 
die issue of die merits. The CRB refused. 
Service of fhese proceedings on Mr. Diniz and the application to stay. 
At no time after Herbert Smith had stated diat Mr. Diniz had not given them 
instructions to accept service, did die solicitors appointed by Mr. Diniz indicate a contrary 
position. Orders were dierefore made by a Master enabling Arrows to serve a concurrent 
writ in Monaco. In view of die delay diat such service might entail (as Monaco is not a 
Convention country) a further order was made for a further concurrent writ to be issued 
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enabling Arrows to serve it on Mr. Diniz in Melbourne, Australia, where, as was referred 
to in the decision of the Contract Recognition Board, he was to compete in the Australian 
Grand Prix. 
On 3rd March 1999 the writ was served on Mr. Diniz in Melbourne. On the same day 
his solicitors entered an acknowledgement of service of the writ that had been sent for 
service to Monaco. His solicitors, when they entered the acknowledgement of service, 
stated that he would be applying for a stay and, on 26th March 1999, issued this 
application to that end. As son as Arrows learned Mr. Diniz intended to apply to stay these 
proceedings, they asked the Contract Recognition Board to adjourn the hearing for 90 
days. The Contract Recognition Board sought representations from the parties on that 
issue and, having considered them, declined to do so. Its decision was communicated to 
the parties on 19th March 1999 with reasons. On 22nd March 1999 the Secretariat gave 
notice that the Contract Recognition Board hearing would take place on 26th May 1999 at 
Geneva, and directed that any further written material should be supplied to the Tribunal 
by 21st May 1999. 
An application was made to this court on 31st March 1999 for transfer of these 
proceedings to this court and on 21st April 1999 an order was made that the application 
for a stay be heard on 17th May 1999 (Monday of this week). 
The issues before the court 
The issues that are before the court on the application can be summarised as follows. 
(1) Is the matter the subject of the proceedings a matter which under clause 11 of the 
agreement between Mr. Diniz and Arrows the parties have agreed be referred to the 
Contract Recognition Board? (2) If so, is the reference to the Contract Recognition Board 
a reference to arbitration or some other form of consensual dispute resolution? (3) If it is 
another form of consensual dispute resolution, should the action be stayed? 
It was agreed that I should determine those issues first and stand over the application 
Arrows had intimated they would make for an injunction against Mr. Diniz continuing 
participation in the proceedings before the Contract Recognition Board, assuming that 
they were successful in resisting a stay. I therefore turn to consider -
Issue 1 - Is the matter the subject of these proceedings a matter which, under clause 11 of 
the agreement, the parties agreed be referred to the Contract Recognition Board? 
A number of considerations were common ground. 
• Clause 11 of the agreement between Mr. Diniz and Arrows is governed by the law of 
England and Wales. 
• Schedule 11 was probably governed by Swiss law. However, there was no evidence that 
the law of Switzerland relating to the construction of agreements differed from the law 
of England and Wales, and therefore the court should determine all issues of 
construction on Schedule 11 applying the principles of law of England and Wales. 
• Although under Swiss law the arbitrators have power to determine their own juris-
diction, that was not relevant to this court's determination of mat same question. 
Having set those matters of common ground out, I now turn to consider the first issue. 
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The scope of die reference. 
The claim before this court is a claim asserted on me basis that the contract between Mr. 
Diniz and Arrows has been terminated. It is on this sole basis that the claim for die payment 
of US$7 million is made. No assertion is made that Mr. Diniz is not free to drive for Sauber. 
The only issue therefore before the English court is whetiier the agreement was terminated 
on the basis of clause 9.2(b) or clause 9.5. If the court determines the issue in favour of 
Arrows, men it will give a judgment entiding Arrows to recover US$7 million from Mr. Diniz 
unless some point is taken in diese proceedings on the nature of the sum claimed. 
Under the terms of the agreement between Arrows and Mr. Diniz unless the claim falls 
within clause 11.1, the claim is subject to die exclusive jurisdiction of this court under die 
provisions of clause 11.2. Clause 11.1 provides that me parties must respect the terms of 
Schedule 11 and in particular clause 7 which provides for die "resolutions of conflicts by 
the Contract Recognition Board". 
It is clear from the terms of schedule 11 mat die object of the Contract Recognition 
Board is to resolve conflicts between contracts fhat cover the same period of time. The 
reference in clause 11 of die agreement between Mr. Diniz and Arrows to "conflicts" is 
therefore a reference to competing or conflicting contracts. Clauses 7.1 and 7.10 of 
Schedule 11 make this clear. 
"7.1 Subject to Clause 10.3 if Contracts are concluded for die services of the same 
driver in respect of die same period of time (or overlapping periods of time) die 
question as to priority between such Contracts shall be exclusively finally and 
conclusively determined by die Board in the manner set out in this Clause 7." 
"7.9 The Board shall within three days from die last day of a Conflicting Contract 
Meeting issue a decision (a "Decision") stating which Contract is die prevailing 
Contract (a "Prevailing Contract") which takes precedence over any odier Contract in 
respect of die same pier of any overlapping period. Without prejudice to Clauses 7.10 
and 7.14 die Decision shall not deal with any odier issue (odier than costs)." 
The concluding words of clause 7.9 are very important in stating diat, subject to clauses 
7.10 and 7.14, the decision of die Contract Recognition Board is not to deal with any 
odier issue. It makes die narrow task of the Contract Recognition Board very clear. There 
are, however, the two specific sections mentioned in die clause and I consider each in 
turn. 
• Clause 7.10 enables the decision of the Contract Recognition Board to specify die 
modification required to die register of contracts. That is purely consequential to die 
decision on priority and it does not in any way expand die jurisdiction of the Contract 
Recognition Board. 
• Clause 7.14 provides as follows: 
"7.14 A Decision may be conditional upon die payment of Compensation being made 
wimin die time limit specified by die Decision, which time limit shall be consistent with 
that specified by die Contract concerned." 
This clause is not material in diis case. No assertion has ever been made by Arrows diat 
die termination of the contract with Mr. Diniz was conditional upon the payment of die 
US$7 million or other compensation by him. Since 13th October 1999 they have always 
contended, as die matters I have set out make clear, diat diey regard die contract as 
terminated. Mr. Diniz has never appeared to dispute diis. 
Thus, in my view, there are no relevant exceptions in this case which permit die 
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Contract Recognition Board to decide any issue other than which contract takes 
precedence, and that is all they are entided to do under clause 7.9. 
This is another important consideration. It is common ground that the Contract 
Recognition Board has no power whatsoever to make an award or make any odier 
dispositive order as between the driver and his Team, for the payment of compensation, 
damages or the US$7 million referred to in clause 9.5 of the agreement between Mr. Diniz 
and Arrows. Even the limited power under clause 7.10 is a power only to make a decision 
on which contract takes precedence conditional on the payment of compensation; it goes 
not further than that. Thus die Contract Recognition Board has no power to make any 
award or other dispositive order in relation to the sole claim made by Arrows against Mr. 
Diniz which is for the payment of US$7 million due on termination. 
It must therefore follow diat it cannot have been agreed by the parties fhat the claim 
itself was to be referred to the Contract Recognition Board as the Contract Recognition 
Board has no power to make an award or other dispositive order in favour of Arrows on 
the subject matter of the claim. The most diat could happen would be for this court to 
impose a temporary stay while the issue as to whether the termination under clause 9.2(b) 
or 9.5 was decided by the Contract Recognition Board. If fhat issue was decided in favour 
of Arrows, then this court would, as the court having exclusive jurisdiction between Arrows 
and Mr. Diniz, have to make die dispositive orders. Furthermore, if some challenge was 
made to the validity of the provision requiring payment of US$7 million and the claim of 
Arrows had to proceed in damages, then it would seem fhat that again was an issue which 
would have to be determined by this court. 
I cannot see how in these circumstances it could have been contemplated by the parties 
fhat this was the way in which a dispute between the driver and his team was to be resolved 
when the team was claiming a sum due under the contract. They would have given the 
body who was to adjudicate upon that claim the power to make a dispositive order. They 
would not have split the claim between two bodies. The fact fhat they did not give any 
power to the Contract Recognition Board to make a dispositive order or award is in my 
judgment a very clear indication that they did not intend such a claim to be referred to the 
Contract Recognition Board. There is therefore, in my view, a furdier reason why there 
cannot have been referred to the Contract Recognition Board the claim for US$7 million 
because the Contract Recognition Board has no power to order the sum to be paid, and by 
the terms of the Contract Recognition Board's jurisdiction, die Board is only to decide the 
issue of competing contracts and the issue of priority between them. 
However, it is contended fhat despite the fact that the Contract Recognition Board has 
no power to make an award or other dispositive order on the claim by Arrows, the 
determination of die issue upon which the claim depends was within die scope of what had 
been referred; this contention relies heavily upon clause 7.11 of die agreement. This 
provides: 
"7.11 In making its Decision die Board shall first determine the question as to whedier 
under the proper law(s) of fhe contract applicable to the Contracts concerned one or 
more of die said Contracts is null and void, has been validly terminated in accordance 
with its terms, including a termination subject to die making of a payment of 
compensation pursuant to and of an amount determined by the Contract ("Com-
pensation"), or has expired. If die Board determines that one or more of the said 
Contracts is not null and void, has not been validly terminated or has not expired, then, 
for die purposes of Clauses 7.12 and 7.13 such Contract or Contracts shall be 
considered valid and in force." 
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It is argued on behalf of Mr. Diniz that the requirement mat die Contract Recognition 
Board should decide whetiier the contract has been terminated in accordance widi its 
terms means that the issue of whetiier the termination is under clause 9.2(b) or 9.5 has 
been referred to die Contract Recognition Board. I do not agree. 
The Contract Recognition Board's function is to decide as between the driver and the two 
teams with which he has a contact which is the contract mat takes precedence; if it is necessary' 
to determine whetiier a contract has been terminated to reach that decision, men plainly mat 
issue would have to be determined by die Contract Recognition Board. In such a case, as was 
rightly accepted by Mr. Littman Q.C., who appeared for Arrows, the issue mat arises is an 
incidental and necessary issue in the course of the Contract Recognition Board deciding me 
matter of priority referred to mem. A finding by mem on the question of termination could 
then take effect as an issue estoppel between me parties in any other proceedings. 
But if there is no issue mat a contract has been terminated, men it is not necessary for 
the Board to determine that issue, and it cannot, in my judgment, fall wimin the scope of 
the matters referred. Clause 7.9 makes it quite clear that the Contract Recognition Board is 
only to determine the issue of precedence between contracts and no other issue, other 
than those under clauses 7.10 and 7.14. If the fact of termination is not in issue and clause 
7.14 does not apply, men, in my view, the issue as to whemer the termination was under 
clause 9.2(b) or clause 9.5 is not within the scope of matters which die Contract 
Recognition Board is entitled to decide and is not within the scope of the matters referred 
or incidental or necessary to a decision on the matters referred. 
Although that is a view mat I have reached on the clear language used in Schedule 11 
and clause 11 of the contract between Mr. Diniz and Arrows, it also appears from the clear 
commercial purpose of the schedule in the contract. The reference to the Contract 
Recognition Board provides a means of deciding a tripartite dispute rapidly, so the parties 
and the Federation know who is entided to the services of die driver. Clause 7.9 requires a 
rapid decision on mis issue and the procedure are designed to enable diis to be done. It is 
not a procedure for determining bilateral disputes between two parties relating to die rights 
and wrongs of a termination. Had it been, die Contract Recognition Board would have 
been given dispositive powers to make an order between the two parties for the payment of 
compensation or damages. 
I have therefore reached die clear conclusion diat the matter die subject of die claim is 
not within die scope of the reference to the Contract Recognition Board and the Contract 
Recognition Board are not entided to consider die matter unless it is necessary or 
incidental to die decision on die matter referred. » 
Was it necessary for the Contract Recognition Board to decide die issue on whetiier 
termination was under clause 9.2(b) or 9.5 as part of die reference to diem? 
In my view the answer to tiiis question is quite clearly no. It was not necessary or 
incidental to any decision on die matter referred. 
In die first place it was clear diat bodi Arrows and Mr. Diniz treated die contract as 
terminated; die letters of 13di October 1998, 17th November 1998, die writ and die 
subsequent contention of die parties leave mis in no doubt whatsoever. There were 
paragraphs in die submissions made by Arrows' solicitors on 5di February 1999 diat have 
become relevant. Those read: 
"32. The issues to be decided in die English Proceedings concern die validity and/or 
termination of die driver contract between Arrows and [Mr. Diniz], and whetiier, if 
terminated, it is subject to compensation and, if so, how much. 
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33. These are the same issues which fall for determination by the [Contract 
Recognition Board] under clause 7.11 . . . 
34. A Decision of the Meeting of the [Contract Recognition Board] under Clause 7.11 
. . . will constitute an interference in the legal rights of the Parties to the Arrows' driver 
contract with [Mr. Diniz). This may give rise to a claim by Arrows against the [Contract 
Recognition Board)." 
These paragraphs merely refer to the pleading. They mischaracterised it. There can have 
been no doubt in anyone's mind that the contract was terminated and that paragraphs in 
the submission to which I have referred went far too wide and were in error. It cannot 
possibly have put the termination in issue. Indeed, this was the conclusion of the Contract 
Recognition Board in their decision at para. 32, to which I have already referred. They 
indeed said that the written submissions from Arrows count for nothing. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the decision of the Contract Recognition Board 
itself shows that the issue which they have to determine could be decided without 
reference to whether the termination was under clause 9.2(b) or 9.5. That is clear from 
para. 46 of die decision which I have set out. There can, in my judgment, be no possible 
argument that a decision on the question of whether termination was under clause 9.2(b) 
or 9.5 was incidental or necessary for a decision on the issue referred to the Contract 
Recognition Board. The Contract Recognition Board have themselves, by their final 
decision, proved that it is not necessary to that decision or incidental to it. They have 
been able to make their decision without deciding the point. 
Thus, in my judgment, diere was no issue that arose on termination which could have 
been incidental or necessary to the matters that the Contract Recognition Board had to 
decide and therefore there was no reference to them of any such issue. Therefore, even if 
they had purported to decide that issue by a Decision on 17th February 1999, they would 
have acted, in my judgment, beyond their jurisdiction. 
In any event have the Contract Recognition Board by their decision determined all they 
have to decide so that there is no outstanding matter to be referred to them? 
In my view, the answer to this question is also clear. The Contract Recognition Board 
has decided the issue of which contract takes precedence or priority. That was their sole 
function and even if, contrary to the view I have expressed, they ever had jurisdiction to 
decide the issue on whether the contract between Mr. Diniz and Arrows was terminated 
under clause 9.2(b) or 9.5, they have reached a decision on the priority between the 
contracts and they are, in the traditional words, "functus officio" - possibly a more 
apposite term than saying their function was spent. 
It was argued that the only reason that the Contract Recognition Board did not 
determine mat issue was because Arrows did not appear and did not present the argument. 
Thus it is said it would not be fair to give Arrows an advantage from the adjournment of 
that question which had been made purely for their benefit. 
However, once the Contract Recognition Board had determined to give fheir decision 
on the only question which was for them - the question of priority or precedence - their 
power to make any decision necessary or incidental to that issue (assuming, contrary to my 
primary conclusion for these purposes that they had such a power) then their power to 
determine that other question came to an end by their own decision. It is quite clear that 
their decision is a final one. That is clear from para. 46 and was publicised to the world by 
the press release made by the Formula One Federation. 
I therefore conclude that the matter the subject of this claim has not been referred to 
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the Contract Recognition Board and determine that it is not within the jurisdiction of the 
Contract Recognition Board to make a decision on the question of whether the 
termination was under clause 9.2 or 9.5. That is a matter which falls within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of this court. 
Issue (2): 
Is the reference to the Contract Recognition Board a reference to arbitration or to some 
other form of consensual dispute resolution? 
As I have decided that the Contract Recognition Board has no jurisdiction to determine 
the matters the subject of the proceedings in this court, it is not strictly necessary for me to 
decide the question whether the reference to the Contract Recognition Board is a 
reference to arbitration. But in view of the excellence of the arguments presented to me, I 
will express my views on the question. 
It was the contention of Arrows that the Contract Recognition Board is not an arbitral 
body and a reference to it was not a reference to arbitration; the function of the Contract 
Recognition Board was merely to supervise the rules of the game or a sport. They relied 
on a number of matters which can be grouped under three principal headings. 
(1) The language in schedule 11 
As Mr. Liftman Q.C. pointed out, there is no reference in Schedule 11 to the word 
"arbitrator" in connection with the Contract Recognition Board or to the Contract 
Recognition Board acting as "arbitrators". On the contrary, the reference is to the language 
of administration - "Contract Recognition Board", "conflicting contract meeting" and 
"decision". In contrast, clause 15.1 of schedule 11 provided: 
"15.1 All disputes arising in connection with this Schedule 11 (other than a dispute in 
respect of matters to be determined by the Board pursuant to clause 7) shall be finally 
settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce in force at the date hereof, by one or more arbitrators appointed in 
accordance with the said rules. 
15.2 Arbitration shall take place in Lausanne (Switzerland)." 
These are powerful arguments, particularly as the schedule is a document which was 
clearly drafted with the greatest care by lawyers. But in my view, terminology, though 
a pointer, can be no more than that. It is necessary to examine the substance of 
whether the Contract Recognition Board's function was an arbitral one or some other 
function. 
(2) The duty of the Contract Recognition Board to apply the law 
Although an arbitral tribunal can, as a matter of the law of England and Wales, apply 
principles that are not strictly legal principles (see s. 46 of the Arbitration Act 1996), it may 
be an indication of whether the process is an arbitral one if the decision maker is free to 
make a decision on a non-legal basis. It is contended by Arrows that this was so, and they 
relied on clause 7.13 of schedule 11. That clause provided: 
"7.13 If pursuant to clause 7.11 the Board shall determine that more than one 
Contract is still valid and in force then irrespective of the dates of signature appearing 
on such Contracts or any formalities (other than Registration pursuant to clause 6.5) 
which may have been carried out in respect thereof or any other matter whatsoever, the 
206 Arbitration International Volume 17 Number 2 
Contract whose date of Registration is die earliest shall be the Prevailing Contract 
regardless of any provision of any law whatsoever." 
However, this provision was merely setting out die simple rule to be applied if there were 
two valid contracts. In all other respects it is quite clear mat the Contract Recognition 
Board was to apply the proper law of the contract. (See, in particular, clause 7.11 set out 
above.) The position is quite unlike that in O'Callaghan v. Coral Racing Limited (C.A. 
19th November 1998 (New Law Online Case transcript)) where the Court of Appeal held 
that in a gaming agreement, a reference of disputes to the Editor of die Sporting Life was 
not an arbitration clause since, as Hirst LJ . at p. 7 of the transcript, 
"To my mind die hallmark of the arbitration process is diat it is a procedure to 
determine the legal rights and obligations of the parties judicially, with binding effect, 
which is enforceable in law, thus reflecting in private proceedings the role of a civil 
court of law." 
In that case die procedure was devoid of legal consequence because die gaming transaction 
was null and void under the Gaming Act of England and Wales. Therefore die Editor of 
Sporting Life could not determine any matter which had legal consequences. Here, clearly, 
die Contract Recognition Board determined a matter that had legal consequences - which 
contract took precedence - and did so in accordance witii die law and of the specific rule 
(which I have set out) if all else failed. 
(3) The procedure adopted 
Although it is accepted tiiat the procedure before the Contract Recognition Board 
contemplated meetings attended by the parties and their lawyers (see clause 7.6 of 
schedule 11) and the Contract Recognition Board having power to order the presence of 
witnesses and the filing of evidence (see clause 7.7), it was argued diat the procedures were 
not the procedures diat were characteristic of arbitration. This can be examined under a 
number of headings: 
(a) There was nothing which stated that die Contract Recognition Board were bound to 
give the parties appearing before it a full opportunity of presenting dieir case 
In my view, it is a characteristic of arbitration that die parties should have a proper 
opportunity of presenting their case. Although there is nodiing expressed in schedule 11, it 
is quite clear from die procedure adopted by the Contract Recognition Board in this case 
diat their procedures enable die parties to make proper representations and to have a full 
opportunity to present dieir case. 
(b) It is a fundamental requirement of an arbitration that die arbitrators do not receive 
unilateral communication from die parties and disclose all communications with one party 
to the other party 
I accept that that is a fundamental requirement of an arbitration, as it goes to the very 
integrity of the arbitrators and their impartiality. 
In diis case, when Arrows applied to the Contract Recognition Board on 29di January 
1999 for copies of communications between die Contract Recognition Board and Sauber 
and copies of die documents submitted by Sauber, a member of die staff of the Secretariat 
of die Contract Recognition Board replied: 
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"The Secretariat is not prepared to send copies of any correspondence because it is 
confidential and because we consider it irrelevant to your purposes." 
In my view, diere can be no doubt that a refusal by the Contract Recognition Board to 
provide communications between it and one of the parties would have been a strong 
indication that die process was not an arbitral one, as secret communications between one 
party and the tribunal are inimical to the arbitral process. However, the refusal to provide 
documents was made by a member of staff of the Secretariat. His letter made it clear that 
die request had to be addressed to the Contract Recognition Board members themselves. I 
have no doubt, given the procedures adopted in respect of odier matters, and the high 
standing of the Contract Recognition Board members, that if an application had been 
made by Arrows to diem, they would not have refused provision of these documents. 
(c) There should be proper and proportionate means for the receipt of evidence 
I accept again that fhe hallmarks of an arbitral process are the provision of proper and 
proportionate procedures for the provision and for fhe receipt of evidence. Arrows 
submitted that die procedures laid down in schedule 11 and fhe decision of fhe Contract 
Recognition Board shows that there was no proper or proportionate procedure for fhe 
proper receipt of evidence. They pointed, in particular, to the fact that the Contract 
Recognition Board had said that it would hear fhe argument on jurisdiction and fhe merits of 
fhe dispute as to whether Arrows were in breach of clause 7 and fhe performance warranties 
within one day starting at Noon, fhough fhey did indicate diat it might be necessary for 
furfher time. The Secretary made it clear what his view was in his letter of 19fh April 1999: 
"As to all such issues, it is a matter for each party to decide what written evidential 
material it seeks to adduce before fhe CRB within fhe confines of die CRB's orders; die 
CRB has of course power to extend die hearing if justice so required it; but at present 
die CRB considers it more than fair to TWR/Arrows fhat this second oral hearing 
should be limited to one day. No previous oral hearings of fhe CRB, which have 
involved disputes much more complicated dian diis dispute, have ever lasted more than 
one day. This dispute has of course extended into two days as a result of TWR/Arrows' 
failure to attend die first hearing." 
It was submitted, powerfully, by Mr. Littman Q.C. tiiat this attitude of fhe Secretary made 
it clear that die procedure was a summary one wholly at variance wifh an arbitral process. 
For example, there was no contemplation of fhe receipt of expert evidence or even the 
appointment of a tribunal-appointed expert which is obviously necessary for the 
determination of fhe issue as to whefher Arrows were in breach of fhe performance 
warranties and Mr. Diniz entided to terminate under clause 9.2(b). 
Although fhe letter from fhe Secretary is somewhat peremptory and surprising in its 
tone, die Contract Recognition Board itself (as opposed to its Secretary) does appear to 
have sought to give the parties proper time in all other respects. For example, it adjourned 
its decision in February; it sought submissions from the parties when an adjournment was 
requested. I am not persuaded diat this single and somewhat peremptory letter from fhe 
Secretary, although possibly indicating die adoption of a procedure inconsistent widi a 
proper arbitral process, enables the procedures to be characterised as diose fhat did not 
have arbitral characteristics. It is important that it was not die decision of fhe Contract 
Recognition Board itself. 
It seems to me fhat there is no evidence to suggest that die Contract Recognition Board 
itself considered that die resolution of the dispute required die hearing to be completed in 
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a day, or would refuse to hear expert evidence, whether appointed by the parties or by the 
Contract Recognition Board itself. On the contrary it seems to me clear beyond doubt that 
if time was required the Board would take the time and arrange for the receipt of expert 
evidence. They clearly would have afforded proper and proportionate means for the 
receipt of evidence. 
(d) The time within which a decision has to be rendered 
It was submitted that the requirement that die Contract Recognition Board render its 
decision within fhree days of the final conflicting contract meeting showed that it was a 
summary procedure inconsistent with arbitration. I do not agree. There is no restriction on 
the number of conflicting contract meetings that can be called. If justice so required, the 
Contract Recognition Board has to hold as many meetings as is required, whatever the 
Secretary may have said in his letter of 19th April 1999. All that is required is a speedy 
decision at the end of the final meeting. Such a requirement is plainly consistent with an 
arbitral or judicial process and not inconsistent with it. 
In addition to those matters, there are three further factors relating to the tribunal that 
are important. 
(e) The identity of the chosen tribunal 
The Contract Recognition Board chosen to determine the issues must, as I have stated, 
consist of three lawyers of international standing. In my view, this is a very important 
indication that the process is intended to be an arbitral one. 
(f) The choosing of the Panel by the President of the Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce 
This is a further factor pointing towards the fact that the process is intended to be 
arbitral. 
(g) The exclusion of those connected with the Federation 
Clauses 2.4 and 2.5 of schedule 11 excludes from participation in the Contract 
Recognition Board that is to determine a matter referred to it those connected with the 
Federation or with Formula One Motor Racing. This shows, again, an intention to make 
the tribunal impartial, consistent with the arbitral process. 
Finally, there are the considerations set out in The Law and Practice of Commercial 
Arbitration in England written by Lord Mustill and Mr. Boyd Q.C. At p. 41, they set out 
the following attributes which they consider must be present. 
"(i) The agreement pursuant to which the process is, or is to be, carried on ("fhe 
procedural agreement") must contemplate that the tribunal which carries on the 
process will make a decision which is binding on the parties to the procedural 
agreement. 
(ii) The procedural agreement must contemplate that the process will be carried on 
between those persons whose substantive rights are determined by the tribunal. 
(iii) The jurisdiction of fhe tribunal to carry on the process and to decide the rights of 
the parties must derive either from the consent of the parties, or from an order of the 
court or from a statute the terms of which make it clear that the process is to be an 
arbitration. 
(iv) The tribunal must be chosen, either by the parties, or by a method to which they 
have consented. 
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(v) The procedural agreement must contemplate that the tribunal will determine die 
rights of the parties in an impartial manner, with the tribunal owing an equal obligation 
of fairness towards bom sides. 
(vi) The agreement of the parties to refer their disputes to die decision of die tribunal 
must be intended to be enforceable in law. 
(vii) The procedural agreement must contemplate a process whereby the tribunal will 
make a decision upon a dispute which is already formulated at the time when the 
tribunal is appointed." 
Each of drose attributes was, in my view, present and I take each in turn. 
(i) It is clear that a decision reached by the Contract Recognition Board in respect of 
which of the conflicting contracts had priority would be legally binding as between die 
parties to the decision. Paragraph 7.13 of schedule 11 supports mis view. 
(ii) The Contract Recognition Board's procedure involves the tripartite determination 
of diat question. 
(iii) Jurisdiction has been conferred by the parties by contracts signed by the Formula 
One racing teams widi the Federation and die contracts between each driver and each 
team. It is common ground diat the fact that there is no bilateral contract between the 
respective teams does not matter; the agreements bring about multilateral contracts as 
occurred long ago in another well known sporting case, "The Satanita" [1897] A.C. 59. It 
is nodiing to the point that diese are contracts of adhesion and die parties have to assent 
diereto if they wish to participate in Formula One racing. 
(iv) The Contract Recognition Board is, as I have set out chosen by a mediod to which 
the parties consented in die agreement. 
(v) For the reasons I have given I consider the agreement contemplates diat the Contract 
Recognition Board will determine die matter impartially and owes equal obligations of 
fairness to bom parties. For the reasons I have given die Secretariat's refusal to provide 
communications between it and one of die parties (which would be a clear instance of a lack 
of impartiality) was contrary to die procedure contemplated by die agreements. Furthermore 
a refusal to give proper time for die presentation of evidence would have been contrary to die 
procedure of fairness contemplated by die agreements. I have already set out my reasons why 
I consider diat die Secretary's letter of 19di April 1999 did not touch on die procedures 
contemplated by die agreement or on what happened in diis case as regards die Contract 
Recognition Board itself. 
(vi) The agreements plainly contemplated diat die agreement to have the Contract 
Recognition Board decide matters was intended to be enforceable. The parties, for 
example, expressly excluded dieir rights to resort to die courts for interim measures. (See 
clauses 7.2 and 10.01 of die schedule 11.) 
(vii) It is clear diat die Contract Recognition Board was appointed to try die issue which 
was formulated at die time die particular Board of diree was appointed, namely which of 
die contracts took precedence. 
Having considered each of diese detailed matters it is necessary to ask the general question: 
was die procedure intended by die agreements, looked at generally, an arbitral process or 
simply some odier form of consensual dispute resolution to determine die rules of die game? 
Clearly many sporting events have procedures diat are not arbitral. No general view can 
be taken and it is necessary to look at die features of die procedures in each case. In tiiis 
case, standing back and looking at die arrangements as a whole, I am of the firm view that 
what was intended and contemplated was an arbitration confined to die question of 
conflicting contracts. Lawyers of distinction were to be chosen as members of the tribunal; 
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evidence was to be received; procedures and hearings necessary for the fair determination 
of that issue were contemplated and a decision with reasons was required. (See clause 7.17 
of the schedule.) 
Although I have reached the view (both from detailed consideration of the matters I 
have set out, and by more general considerations) quite independently, I am very glad that 
it is also the view of the Contract Recognition Board. Although it could be said of the 
Contract Recognition Board that they were bound, in any event, to say that, I consider that 
the decision reached by lawyers of such considerable international standing and distinction 
is entitled to the highest respect. It is a great comfort to me that their views coincide with 
my own. 
There are before the court opinions of Swiss lawyers on the question of whether the 
procedure is an arbitral one. However, they conflict and the parties were content that I 
should decide this issue on the basis of the law of England and Wales and in accordance 
with the general principles of impartiality and fairness that are common to all systems of 
arbitration. I therefore conclude, on this second issue, that the procedure was an arbitral 
one and the Arbitration Act would have been applicable to it. 
I therefore turn to issue 3. 
I can deal with this shortly. In my view it would not be helpful for me to express a view 
on what conclusion I would have come to if I had decided the claim had been referred to 
the Contract Recognition Board but they were not an arbitral body. The exercise of my 
discretion to grant a stay under the inherent jurisdiction of the courts, (see Channel 
Tunnel Group Limited v. Balfour Beatty [1993] A.C., 334) would, to an extent, have 
depended on the view I would have formed about die nature of the Contract Recognition 
Board. As I have not formed any view on their function other than that their function was 
an arbitral one, it would, in my view, not be helpful to express a view on this third issue. 
For those reasons, therefore, I refuse a stay. The proceedings against Mr. Diniz must 
continue before this court which the parties have agreed has the exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine them. 
Editors' Postscript: 
There were two further judgments in this action delivered in the English Commercial 
Court. On 4 May 2000, Mr Justice Longmore struck out the Claimants' claim as being 
misconceived, but allowed them to re-plead their case as a claim for damages for Mr 
Diniz's alleged wrongful repudiation of the parties' contract. On 2 February 2001, 
following an eight-day trial, Mr Justice Tomlinson dismissed the Claimants' re-pleaded 
claims. The learned Judge also considered the CRB proceedings in relation to three 
issues: (i) the Claimants' claim for damages on the basis that Mr Diniz had wrongly 
invoked the CRB's jurisdiction in breach of the parties' qualified exclusive jurisdiction 
clause in favour of the English High Court; (ii) Mr Diniz's claim on the CRB's second 
award dated 11 May 2000 for his costs incurred in the CRB arbitration proceedings; and 
(iii) the Claimants' contention that the CRB's first award dated 17 February 1999 operated 
as an estoppel preventing Mr Diniz from denying that the parties' agreement had been 
terminated under Clause 9.5, thereby entiding die Claimants to payment of US$7 million 
from Mr Diniz. As to (i), mere was no breach by Mr Diniz and no proof of any damages; 
as to (ii), the CRB's order for payment of Mr Diniz's costs was enforced; and as to (iii), 
there was no estoppel. (Mr Justice Thomas delivered no separate reasons for his anti-
arbitration injunction consequent upon his refusal to stay die English litigation; and the 
CRB made its second award on costs by express further agreement of the parties.) 
